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This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations
in which an inactive third player is present. The proposer X suggests an allocation
(a, y, z) on how to divide a cake between X,Y and Z. A message m that (partially)
reveals this proposal is sent to the responder Y who has to decide whether to
accept or reject it. If Y accepts, each player gets paid according to the proposal,
otherwise each player receives zero. In our experiments the three messages m-
(T, y, z), m- y, and m- z were used. The information condition is common
knowledge. The proposer's offer is seen to depend on the information condition.
Specifically, the lower the information content of the message, the greedier the
Jemand of thi~ propaticr. In the case where m- z, the modal proposal allocates
(almost) all of the cake to X. In the other cases, the responder receives slightly
more than 1~3 of the cake on average.1
1 Introduction
Yrevious cxperim~~ntal inviytigations of ultimatum and dictator games have shown that
observed outcomes differ markedly and systematically from the subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome that is based on the auxiliary assumption that it is common knowledge
that bargainers seek to maximize monetary payoffs. Whereas this subgame perfect equi-
librium requires the proposer to demand essentially all of the cake, we tend to observe
demands of just over 50Q1o of the cake; the mode is often a demand of exactly 50010, the
mean demand is less than 70Q1o, too greedy demands are rejected and less than lq of the
data is in the neighborhood of the game theoretic prediction. (See Roth (1992) for a re-
cent survey.) Similarly, a fair division is often observed in dictator experiments although
- as shown by the double blind experiments by Hoffman et aL (1993) - this phenomenon
is less reliable than the robust results of ultimatum bargaining. This "anomaly" has
sparked a lively and still ongoing debate about the predictive role of game theory and,
more specifically, about the role of fairness considerations in economics.
The debate has shown that issues of fairness aze complicated. Are the data beat ex-
plained by assuming that proposers care for fairness, that they have altruistic motives?
Or should we opt for the alternative explanation that proposers are basically selfish but
take into account the possibility that at least some responders might be motivated by
distributional considerations. Hence, can the proposals be explained as strategic re-
sponses to respouders' willingness to refuse `insultingly low' offers? In this case, what
do we mcan by an `insultingly low' offer and how do distributional concerns enter the
responder's considerations? Note, however, that the latter type of strategic considera-
tions cannot account for the results of non-double blind dictator experiments. So is it
perhaps true that allocators just do not want to reveal that they are selfish and that
considerations of fairness have no role to play after all? Is it true that with enough ex-
periencc, and if the. conditions are sufficiently favorable, behavior converges to the game
theoretic prediction that is based on monetary considerations alone? In this case, which
conditions are favorable for `gamesmanship'?
This paper reports on an experiment that was designed in order to get a better2
understanding of theae iasuea. Especially, it combines the esaential aspecta of ultima-
tum bargaining with those of dictatorship games. In order to explore more thoroughly
whether and how fairnesa considerationa in9uence behavior, we performed ultimatum
bargaining experiments with three playera, X, Y and Z instead of the usual two. Player
X makes a proposal (x, y, z) of how to divide a certain amount of money M. The rules
of the game specify a certain amallest money unit E~ 0; amounta have to be integer
multiples of E and X ia required to allocate at least E to both Y and Z. Player Y then
geta some information, a message m - m(x, y, z), about the proposal, and, on the basie
of this information, he has to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. If he
accepts, each player in the triad geta paid according to the proposal, if he rejecta none
of the players receives anything. Note that player Z does not make any decisions, hence,
he has no strategic power at all. In our actual experiment we mostly had bf - f12, -
and E - f0, 50, sometimea we put M- j24, - and E- f1, -. (At the time of the
experiment f1, - ti 50.56).
Since the rules of the game specify a strictly positive E, it follows that, if player }'
is motivated only by hia own payoffs, the message m is irrelevant for hia decision: He
should accept no matter what the message is. Hence, if both X and Y are motivated
only by their own monetary gains and if X knows this, then Lhe play will be independent
of what messages are allowed: Player X will choose (M - 2E,E,E), send the message
m(M - 2E,E,E) and Y will accept. Formally, the ultimatum bargaining game (with
complete information) and utility functiona UX - uX(x),Uy - uy(y) with uX and uy
strictly increasing on R has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and in this equilibrium
player Y always accepta and player X proposes (M - 2E, E, E). For the case of the selfish
players, game theory thus provides a clear benchmark for experimental results: It predicts
the proposal to be independent of the information conditions, to be extreme, and to be
accepted.
At the other extreme we have the case in which players have a strong intrinsic motiva-
tion for fairness. In this case, we would also predict the outcome to be independent of the
information conditions, viz. player X will propose that each player gets M~3 no matter
what the message is. However, by varying the information condition we can change the3
scope for strategic behavior. For example, if m(x, y, z) - y so that the responder only
gets to hear his own share, then the responder, Y, cannot monitor whether the proposer,
X, keeps to the fairness norm, and the proposer can increase his payoff by proposing
(2M~3 - E , M~3, e) instead of (M~3, M~3, M~3). Our experiment was designed to see
whether such systematic changea do indeed take place.
In the experiment, the responder Y received one of three posaible messagea about the
proposal. The responder either had
(i) Ftill information: m - (x,y,z)
(ii) Essential information: m - y
(iii) Irrelevant information: m - z
In each round of the experiment, the condition that prevailed was common knowledge
amoug the players, and the proposer knew the condition before making his offer. Some
groups oí subjects received the cycle treatment: Subjects played 9 rounda (each round
against different opponents) with information being full in the rounds 1, 4 and 7, in-
formation being essential in rounds 2, 5 and 8, and information being irrelevant in the
rounds 3, 6 and 9. Other groups of subjects received the constant tneatment: Playing 6
rounds against changing opponents, these subjects either always got full, or essential, or
irrelevant information.
The data collected in the experiment display the following regularities:
R~: The dummy, Z, gets a very small amount. In the last cycle, only 20qo of the
proposers offered Z more than 2e when m-(x, y, z), while none of the proposers
offered Z more than 2e when m- y. The dummy geta a little more when m- z
but in that case the rc~ponder only gets a marginal amount. Flence, the data show
that only very few proposers have a strong intrinsic motivation for fairness.
RZ: The outcome depends strongly on the information condition. In those groups
playing the cycle mode, the proposer asks for about half of the cake in the full
information condition, he demands slightly more in the case oi essential informa-
tion, and he asks for almost all of the cake in the case where the responder has4
irrelevant information. The respondet gets (slightly more) than one-third of the
cake when iniormation is full or essential, and he gets virtually nothing in the case
of irrelevant information.
R3: I'roposers' demands are more greedy later on in the game. Experienced players
allocate less to the dummy. The shaze of the responder, however, does not vazy
greatly during the experiment.
There are systematic differences between the proposals in the cycle mode and those
in the constant mode. Proposers who constantly face the most favorable informa-
tion condition, m- z, make demands that are less greedy than the demands that
proposers playing the cycle mode make in this condition. On the other hand, pro-
posers from the constant mode make more greedy demands if they are constantly
playing a situation in which the information is full or essential.
RS: In the groups playing the cycle mode, the disagreements are concentrated in the
rounds where the responder has irrelevant information, whereas in the groups play-
ing the constant mode, the disagreements are more or lesa uniformly distributed.
Interestingly, there are only a few rejections in the groups that constantly íace
irrelevant information.
The overall conclusion that we draw from these regularities is that proposers try to
react strategically to the information of the responder by anticipating his inferences. The
fact that most proposers allocate marginal amounts to the dummy (resp. responder)
in information condition y(resp. z), suggests that most proposers aim to maximize
their own personal monetary payoffs. An explanation for why proposers do not demand
almost the entire cake, ia that they aze not certain that responders are also purely
selfish. Uncertainty concerning the belieis, motives and rationality of the responders
induce.g different accommodating proposals in difierent information conditions.
Regularity R~ shows that propoaers do not have a strong intrinsic motivation for
fairness. An explanation for why the dummy gets (a little more) when m(s, y, z) - z is
that z might serve as a signal for y in that case: If z is low, this might signal that X
is greedy, hence, that also y is low and that Y does not lose much by rejecting. Hence,5
X proposes a óigh z to make Y believe that y is also high. During the game, however,
players learnt to view high values of z(say z around M~3) with auapicion, aince indeed
tt~ey are not strongly correlated with high y values. Consequently, Y ia inclined to reject
rnessages consisting of high z values as well and X will not offer sucb proposals. In the
last cycle, z is also low in the case where m(x, y, z) - z. "
Regularity Rz may be explained by proposers being uncertain about the motives of
responders and them trying to manipulate the respondera' inferencea to their advantages.
For exarnple, consider a selfish maximizing proposcr X who is not completely sure about
the motives of the responder Y. Perhaps Y is a selfish maximizer as well, or perhaps
Y cares about person Z, or perhaps he is insulted if offered low payoffs. One might
expect such a proposer to ask less for himself in the full information condition than
iu the casc whcre Y has esscntial information. Suppose that X proposes (M - g-
e,y,E) to Y in information condition y. In the full iníormation condition, Y would have
additional arguments for rejecting this proposal: (i) Y might be intrinsically motivated
by íairness and seeing that Z geta only E, he might be upset, (ii) Y might be motivated
by distributional considerations, seeing that X allocates that much to himself he might
cnvy X, and he might begrudge and reject the proposal. In order to adjust fnr these
effects, X has to sweeten the deal, either by raising z(to counteract (i)) or by raising
y (to counteract (ii) and indirectly also counter (i) by `bribing' Y). In any case, X will
have to be content with a lesser share for himself.
The experience effect mentioned in regularity R3 is probably not surprising: players
have to learn to understand the game. In the beginning there are relatively many 4equal
splitsr, but these no longer appear when players better understand the incentive structure
of the game. It is quite interesting that a pretest that was conducted allows us to split
the proposers into uegoists" and "intermediates" and that, although these different types
behave difíerently at the beginning of the game, these differences vanish with experience.
The differences between the cycle mode and the constant mode (regularities R~ and
RS) are yuite striking. It is hard to explain why proposers who constantly faced a less
(resp. more) favorable information condition, made more (resp. less) greedy demands
than the proposcrs in the cycle mode did. Perhaps R4 might be interpreted as proposers6
aiming to obtain a certaio aspiration level. Alternatively, it might be that responders
in the cycle mode are more likely to reject any offer in the z- information condition
than the conatant-z reaponders are, aince the former accumulate more income during
the experiment. If these responders are going to reject in any case, one might as well
make an extreme demand in the z-condition since the signal is uninformative.
Generally speaking, responders in our experiment aze very accommodating and com-
pazed to other ultimatum bargaining experimenta we have very few rejectiona, the overall
rate being 7oI'o (see Kagel, Kim and Moser (1992) for a study with much higher rejection
ratea). In the cycle mode, rejections are concentrated in the round where reapondera
have irrelevant iníormation and, indeed, in theae rounds the ahare that is allocated to
responders is quite amall so that the sacrifice is relatively minor. In contrast there aze
only few disagreements in the groups that constantly play the z-condition. Although this
might partly be explained by the fact that proposers are somewhat lesa greedy in the
constant mode, the overriding force aeems to be that, in the constant mode, responders
leatn to resign themselvea to their fate.
Unfortunately, we do not yet have a fully satisfa~ctory explanation of respondera'
behavior. Clearly, the relative frequency of conflicts (70!' 0) proves that responders must
be guided by non-monetary incentivea. In all rejected proposala the share y was low and
in the case of full information, there ia no aingle rejection whích can be clearly attributed
to a low z-assignment. Hence, responders do not seem to care for the dummy. The data
(backed by the poat experimental queationnaire) tell us that respondera reject when they
perceive the ratio y~x to be small, hence diatributional considerations do seem to play a
role and responders aeem willing to punish proposers who are too greedy. Lack of data,
however, preventa ua from eaying more.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our
experimental design. Sections 3 and 4 describe and analyze the data from the cycle
mode. Section 5 is devoted to the constant information mode and Section 6 compares
the cycle ~node to the conatant mode. Section 7 concludes.7
2 Experimental Design
We recruited altogether 216 undergraduate students from the Univetaity of Tilburg to
participate in the experiment. They had to register personally and most of them were
first or second year students in economics. The studenta had no background in game
theory. The experiment was run on four consecutive evenings, two evenings being devoted
to the cycle mode and two devoted to the conatant mode. Altogether we had four sesaiona
(groups) that played the cycle mode, and two aessions for each of the oonatant information
conditions, with there being three different information conditions, viz. full, éssential
and irrelevant.
When entering the meeting room students received their identification code on a letter
of welcome (see Appendix A). Although this letter, as well as all other materials were in
English, a Dutch translation was read aloud by one of the authors. We then distributed
the "Instructions and decision form for the preliminary experiment" (see Appendix B1).
This pretest served two purposes: (i) To make sure that subjects would earn at least so
much rnoney that would make it worthwhile for them to show up (we indicated minimum
and maximum amounts participants could earn when recruiting them) and (ii) to get
some information about the degree to which participants are altruistic. Although the
pretest can separate "egoistsr from "intermediates" (see Appendix B2), it turns out
that in the main experiment, the behavior of these two groups does not differ very much.
There[ore, we will not consider the pretest in detail. -
After the pretest the subject group was split into three subgroups which were then
assigned to three different classrooms. Since these lecture rooms were rather large it
was easy to exclude any communication between participants. Next, it was randomly
decided which role (proposer, responder or dummy) each subgroup would play and in-
structions for the main experiment were distributed. In each of the sessiona 1, 2, 3 and
4 devoted to the cycle mode 27 subjects participated: 9 persons for each role. They
played the ultimatum game for 9 rounds, where a round-robin style matching was used
(see Appendix G1). In each round they bargained for f 12,- which at the time of the
experiment was about á6.80. The f 12,- were represented as 120 points and the rulea8
oí the game apecified that the propoaer had to allocate at least 5 pointa to each player.
Hence, each player received at least f 0,50 (~ á0.28) in each round if the proposal was
accepted. All participanta received the same inatructione (Appendices C.X, C.Y and
C.Z, respectively), of which a Dutch translation was read aloud. The inatructions inform
subjecta that they play the full information condition (`condition xyz') in the rounds 1,
4 and 7, that they play the esaential information condition (`condition y') in the rounds
2, 5 and 8 and that they play the irrelevant information condition (`condition z') in the
rounds 3, 6 and 9. Whereas playera X and Y also got a deciaion form which reminded
them of the number of rounds and the changing information conditions (see Appendicea
D.X and D.Y), players Z received only a balance sheet to record their payoffs (Appendix
D.Z).
Players X also received a communication sheet each round (Appendix E) which was
used to communicate all the deciaiona between the players. At the end of each round,
players got feedback about what happened during this round, i.e. they got to hear the
proposal that was actually made in their triad as well as the responder's reaction. For
each group there was a measenger communicating this information between the players.
If the information condition was xyz, the communication sheet with the proposal (x, y, z)
was transformed by the measenger from X to Y, from Y back to X to inform X about
Y's response, and then finally to player Z so that he can record the play and compute
his payofí. In the two other information conditions (y and z), players X, when receiving
Y's responae, were asked to reveal their whole proposal (x, y, z) below the dotted line
on the communication aheet which then was transferred to Y and then to Z so that,
regardless oí the information condition, all three players X, Y, and Z always knew the
whole proposal (x, y, z) when the round was over.
In the constnnt injormation mode (Sessions 11 and 41 for the case where m - (x, y, z),
sessions 22 and 52 for the case where m- y, and sessions 33 and 63 for the case where
m- z) the instructiona, decision forms, and communication sheets were adapted to
the constant information condition. Aa the changea were only minor, we do not include
these forms in the appendicea; they are available from the authors upon reque"st. Here
the part of the instructions concerning the specific information condition was not read9
aloud. It was just mentioned that this differs from one group to another and that any
questions concerning this condition can only be answered privately. The experiment was
run in the same way as in the cycle mode. Each session devoted to the conatant mode
involved only 18 persons, hence, only 6 rounds, round-robin style (see Appendix G2),
were played. Each proposer met each responder only once. Another difference is that,
in the constant mode, the last three rounds the stakes were doubled: 120 pointa were f
24,- instead of f 12,- in the first three rounds. Table 1 summazizes our deaign.
round
session
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1, 2, 3, 4 xyz y z xyz y z xyz y z
11,41 xyz xyz xyz xyz xyz xyz
22, 52 y y y y y y
33, 63 z z z z z z
Table 1. Sessions and information conditions. Each of the sessions 1, 2, 3,
4(the cycle mode) involves 9 players in each of the 3 roles and f 12,- to be
divided in each round. Sessions with constant information conditions involve
6 players in each role, and f 12,- (resp. f 24,-) to be divided in each of the
first (resp. last) 3 rounds. Altogether we have 4 x 9 x 9- 324 observations
for the cycle mode and 2 x 6 x 6- 72 observations for each constant mode,
a Lotal of 540 obs~rvations.
After the last round, all participants were asked to fill out a short postexperimen-
tal questionnaire (see Appendix F). Afterwards they were paid privately according to
their payoffs in the Yretest and the main experiment. In order to keep the Z-players
busy, they were asked to check the earnings of all players. More apecifically, one group
of Z-pla}~ers were asked to calculate the earnings of all players of another group, i.e.
no Z-player double checked the earnings of individuals with whom he could have ever
interacted. The X- and Y-persons were informed about this procedure after filling out
the postexperimental questionnaire. We ïound very few inconsistencies of the declared
earnings; mostly due to obvious mistakes. We never found out about a participant who10
wanted to cheat.
An experimental sesaion lasted about two hours. The earninga of participante varied
widely from lesa than j 10 to more than j 110. Pazticipanta with low eazninga were very
fruatrated and complained about their bad luck, mainly for not being selected as player
X.
3 The Data from the Cycle Mode
Appendix H contains the proposals made in the cycle made by the 36 proposers that
pazticipated in the experiment. Each row corresponda with a proposer, each proposer
being identified with a code IDENT. The first three columns ( V~~, V13i V~~) give the
proposal (x, y, z) that was made in the first round and Vis apecifiea the responder's
reaction to this propoaal ( Vla - 1 if the proposal was accepted, Vis - 0 if it was
rejected). The next three columns (V18, V~~, Vra) specify the proposal that was made in
the second round, etc. Recall írom Table 1 that different rounda correapond to different
information conditiona. By using the matching scheme (Appendix G), the reader is
able to construct the entire personal hiatory of each participant in the experiment from
the data in Appendix H. (The full data set, including the reaults of the preteat and
the answera to the postexperimental questionnaire is available from the authors upon
request. )
To provide a global picture of what ia happening during the experiment, we start
by giving the mean proposal in every round. Figure 1 graphically displays the average
proposal from each round. Table 2 gives the means and the standard deviations of the
proposals. Table 2 ia aplit into three panela that wrrespond to the three different infor-
mation conditions. Recall Lhat each cell of each matrix is based on 36 observations.
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F wrc ~: qv~~~~ fxopeaals ..:~ ~ ,c~ n~od{ .12
z
round x y z ~ rej.
1 53.06 44.31 22.64 1
(14.56) (9.57) (14.01)
4 57.92 46.53 15.56 0
(10.24) (10.34) (14.18)
7 63.06 46.11 10.83 0
(10.91) (9.57) (8.9)
round x y z ~ rej.
2 64.44 46.81 8.75 2
(10.87) ( 10.57) (6.80)
5 68.89 45.14 5.97 0
(9.11) (8.74) (2.88)
8 72.64 42.08 5.27 1
(10.18) (10.03) (].16)
round x y z ;~ rej.
3 91.11 11.94 16.94 7
(20.74) (10.16) (14.55)
6 94.58 9.86 15.42 4
(17.38) (8.90) (13.91)
9 99.31 8.47 12.22 7
(14.25) (7.15) (10.31)
Table 2: Averages and standard deviations of proposals in information condition z of
the cycle mode. (Top panel: m- xyz, middle panel: m- y, bottom panel:
m - z).13
Table 3 provides another summary of the data. We regresaed the components of the
proposal on the following dummiea:
(i) EXPt: which takes the value one if the proposer has been confronted with this
information condition at least once before, and zero otherwiae.
(ii) EXP~: which take the value one in the last cycle (rounds ?, 8 and 9) and zero
otherwise.
(iii) ESS: which take the value one in the essential information condition (m - y) and
zero otherwise. -
(iv) IRR: which takes the value one in the case with irrelevant information (m - z)
and zero otherwise.
Table 3 contains the results of these regressiona. The numbera in bracketa are the t-valuea
associated with the null-hypothesis that the coefficient of the dummy is zero. According
to conventional tests, in the first row all coefficients are significantly different from zero
at the lqo-level. In the second row, this only holds for the IRR-dummy and in the last
row, it holds for all coefficients except that of IRR.
X
CONST EXP, EXP~ ESS IRR R'
53.66 13.06 8.80 10.65 36.99 0.58
(31.84) (4.08) (4.77) (5.77) (20.04)
46.53 -2.64 -2.13 -0.97 -35.56 0.75
(39.35) (-1.18) (-1.64) (-0.75) (-27.45)
19.83 -10.46 -6.67 -9.68 -1.48 0.18
(14.76) (-4.10) (-4.53) (-6.57) (-1.01)
Table 3: Regression results.
Write p(x, t) (resp. p(y, t), p(z, t)) for the amount that the proposer allocatea to P
(P E{X, Y, Z, }) in the t-th cycle when the information condition is xyz (resp. y, resp.14
z). (The first cycle conaista of the rounda 1,2,3, etc.) Using these notations the data
allow ua to draw the following broad conclusions:
(i) Fairnesa: z(y, t) and y(z, t) are small for any value oí t, hence, the hypothesis that
proposers are intrinaically motivated by fairnesa is rejected.
(ii) Selfiahncse: y(x, t) and y(y, t) are not amall for any value of t, hence, the hypothesis
that proposers behave as if it is common knowledge that both the propoaer and the
responder are selfiah is rejected. However, in information condition z, the proposer
asks for almost all o[ the cake.
(iii) Strategic behavior: The proposal depends on the information condition, hence be-
havior is atrategic. We have that
x(x, t) ~ x(y, t) ~ x(z,t)
y(z,t) c y(x,t) ti y(y,t)
z(y,t) c z(x,t) ti z(z,t)
In information condition z, the proposer asks for almost all of the cake. In the
information condition y the responder gets approximately 1~3 of the cake, while
the dummy gets e. Information condition xyz is slightly more favorable for both
the dummy and the responder than condition y.
(iv) Learning: The share that the proposer allocates to himself increases with experi-
ence, while the ahare that is allocated to the dummy decreases. There is not so
much variation in the share that is allocated to the reaponder.
(v) Rejections: The altogether 324 plays yield only 22 rejections, hence, the percentage
of rejected offera is with 6,7901o remarkably low. Almost al) of the rejections, 18 out
of 22, occur in information condition z. Hence, of the 104 plays in this condition,
16.7qo result in disagreement.
In the next section we acrutiniae the data more closely to substantiate the above claims.15
4 The Cycle Mode: A Closer Look at the Data
If proposers were intrinsically motivated by fairness considerationa, they would allocate
considerable amounts to Z in condition y and to Y in condition z. Table 4 ahows that
responders do not behave in this way: The modal value of y(z,t) (resp. z(y,t)) is the
minimal amount that proposers have to allocate in order not to violate the rules. In
fact, in the last cycle, almost all of the proposera (94qo) offer Z thia minimal amount in
information condition y, while the remaining proposers offer only marginally more.
z(y,E) ~ G 5 ~ G 10
t - 1 23 31
t - 2 31 35
t - 3 34 36
y(z,t) ~ G 5 ~ G 10
t - 1 22 24
t - 2 26 27
t-3 `LS 29
Table 4 Most proposers put that component of the offer that is not visible for the
responder at the minimum level.
It is remarkable that the numbers in the right-hand panel of Table 4 are lower than
the numbers in the left-hand panel. To investigate this issue more systematically, we
study the individual differences y(z, t) - z(y, t) in Table 5. The first ten columna apecify
the frequency distribution of this variable; the final columna give the mean, standard
deviation and t-value associated with this variable. From the last column we see that the
hypothesis that y(z, t) - z(y, t) is rejected by a standard t-test at the 5QI'o level for any
cycle t. (Note though that in the last cycle, y(z, t) - z(y, t) for 78qo of the propoaers.) Of
course, such conventional tests rely on the data being an independent sample. Since our
subjects have a history in common, the assumptions underlying traditional tests are not
literally satisfied, hence, we do not put too much emphasis on the t values. Nevertheless,
since the t values provide a useful comparison benchmark it is worthwhile to report them.ls
y(z,t) - z(y,t) -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 ~ a t
t-1 - 2 3 19 1 4 2 2 2 - 3.19 9.50 2.01
t- 2 - - 3 24 1 2 1 3 1 1 3.89 8.75 -2.66
t- 3 - - - 28 1 2 2 3 - - 3.19 6.05 3.16
Table b The hypotheais y(z, t) - z(y, t) is rejected at the 5~ level against the hypoth-
esis y(z, t) ~ z(y, t).
One explanation for why y(z, t) ~ z(y, t) might be that proposers were not completely
convinced that they would not be matched with the same responder again, i.e. that they
were worried about reputation effects. (After all, the responder learned the actual value
of y at the end of each round). However, aince the difference persists until the very last
round, this explanation is not convincing. On the contrary, aince the t-values from the
last column of Table 5 are increasing with playera' experience, one might argue that the
reputation effect was not important. Appazently, proposers felt that responders were
more powerful than dummies and, therefore, should be given a higher share of the cake.
Next we move on to atudy the extent to which behavior of individual propósers de-
pends on the content of the message. Table 6 specifies the individual differences between
the case of full information and the case of essential information. Because of the learn-
ing that takes place, we aplit the data into the three cyclea. The first ten columns give
the frequency distributions, the remaining columna the mean standard deviation and
t-values.
G ]
x(y, t) - x(x, t) -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~ o t
t- 1 2 1 5 3 8 5 4 3 3 2 11.39 15.93 4.29
t- 2 1 1 7 8 7 3 3 2 - 4 10.97 12.06 5.46
t- 3 - 2 8 6 7 5 6 1 - 1 9.58 9.21 6.2417
~ ~
y(y,t) - y(x,t) -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 p a t
t-1 2 - 8 2 11 4 3 3 3 1 2.50 13.12 1.14
t- Z - 3 5 9 11 1 4 3 - - -1.39 8.33 -1.0
t- 3 - 6 7 4 13 5 1 - - - -4.03 7.15 -3.38
G ~
z(y,t) - z(x,t) -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 ~ o t
t- 1 7 1 1 6 2 3 5 10 - 1 -13.89 14.05 -5.93
t- 2 4 2 3 1 - - 8 17 1 - -9.58 14.31 -4.02
t- 3 - I 2 3 1 - 9 20 - - -5.56 8.77 -3.80
Table 8 Individual differences between the full information condition and the condition
with essential information.
The first panel in Table 6 shows that an individual proposer allocates more to himself
in the essential information condition than in the ca,ge of full information. One might say
that, if it is not so easy for othera to verify whether propoaers are greedy, they become
more demanding. The difference is highly significant.
In the second panel, the change in sign is worth noticing. Although in the firat cycle
the responder gets more in the y- mode, in later cycles he gets more in the xyz-mode. In
the previous section we already explained why one would expect the sign to be as it is
for experieuced players: If the responder gets more information, he receivea more signals
that the offer is "unfair", and to counteract the additional inclination to reject the offer,
the proposer has to allocate somewhat more to the responder. (Note that in the aecond
panel only the difference in the third cycle is significant at the 5qo level according to a
standard test.)
In the third panel one notices that the difference becomea amaller with experience:
z(x, t) decreases faster with t than z(y, t) does. The reason is simply that z(y, l) ie
already close to its minimal level, hence, there is no scope for it to go down any further.
(We return to the learning effect below).18
One can do a similaz exercise as above to compare the proposals in the y-condition
with those in the z-condition. Table 7 givea the t-values associated with these compar-
isons. We see that x(z,t) ~ x(y,t),that y(z,t) G y(y,t), that z(z,t) 1 z(y,t) and that
all differencea are highly significant.
x(z,t) - x(y,t) y(z,t) - y(y,t) z(z,t) - z(y,t)
t - 1 7.81 -14.00 3.72
t-2 8.00 -16.31 9.18
t-3 8.73 -16.42 1.it;
Table 7 t-values associated with the differences of the proposal in the z-mode with that
in the y-mode.
From tables 6 and 7 the signs of the differences x(z,t) - x(x,t) and y(z,t) - y(x,t)
follow unambiguously. The difference z(z, t) - z(x, t) has zero as its modal value for
all t, has a mean that ia close to zero and has a large standard deviation. It may be
argued that, in the x-condition, the z-variable is determined by completely different
considerations than in the z-condition. For example, in the x-condition, X might choose
a high value of z aince he believes that Y cares about Z's payoffs, while in the z-condition
X might think that Y believes y to be positively correlated with z. As a wnsequence,
we do not put much emphasis on the variable z(z, t) - z(x, t).
Note that there is little we can say about whether the responder bases his decision on
what is allocated to Z: We have only one rejection if m-(x,y, z), namely of (110,5,5).
However, the data reveal that the proposer does not care about Z and that he expects
the responder not to caze either.
As of the second cycle, in information condition x, the modal value of z is the minimal
level that is allowed (Table 8). Most propoaers are not shy to openly diaplay that they
allocate only a marginal amount to Z. On the basis of Table 8 one might conjecture that,
with more experience, all propoaers will allocate only marginal amounts to the dummy
in information condition x. The data from the constant mode provide some support
from this conjecture, since there 92qo of the propoaera do indeed offer at most 2e in the
last round, while only 509ó of the proposers start out by offering just f. (See Section 5).19
z(x,t) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 ? 50
t-1 8 6 - 4 - 9 - 8 1 -
t-2 15 10 - 1 1 3 1 3 - 1
t-3 19 10 - - 4 2 1 - - -
Table 8 Frequency distribution of z(x,t)
Turning now again to information condition z, we note that proposers find this condi-
tion the most puzzling one. (Evidence is provided by the rather large standard deviations
of z(and also of y) in this condition. Also compare the different R~'s in Table 2.) The
dilem~na is that neither a high nor a low value of z can aignal to the reaponder that
y will be large. (Actually, setting z at a too high level signala that y must be small).
It turns out that y(z,t) and z(z,t) are positively correlated, the correlation coefácients
are given by 0.39 (t - 1), 0.09 (t - 2), and 0.31 (t - 3). Hence, the correlations are
somewhat significant in the first and third cyclea. Nevertheleae, responders view high
z-values with suspicion as is shown by Table 9. This Table pools all 108 obaervationa
from the z-condition and lists their z-values with the responses that they elicited. One
sees that the percentage of rejected proposals does not decrease with z.

























Table 9 z-values of proposals in information condition z in the cycle mode aggregated
over all cycles with respective responses.
Table 9 shows that, in the cycle mode, 16.7qo of all plays in ínformation condition
z result in disagreement. In contrast, the percentage of conflicta is remarkably low in
the information conditions x and y (these are, respectively lesa than lolo and 2.8010. In
condition x only (110,5,5) is rejected once; in condition y the values 20,30 and 35 are
each rejected once). That there are only few rejections in these latter casea might be
explained by the fact that proposers make reasonably generous offers to responders:
In information condition x there are only 13 proposals (12010) with y G 40, while in20
information condition y there are only 20 such proposals (19q). In contrast, y is rather
low in condition z. Recall that, due to our information feedback, responders had full
knowledge of all previous proposals that were made to them, hence, in the second and
third cycle, they had learned that y(z) was aignificantly lowet than y(x) and y(y). The
most simple theory of adaptive expectationa, in which respondera expect the same y-
share as in the previous cycle, can already explain moat of the rejectiona: 9 out of I1
cases of conflict that occurred in the z-condition of the second or thitd cycle, were caused
by responders who had experienced y- 5 in the previous cycle.
Oí course the question remains why responders reject any proposals at all. Here
we can offer the following observationa. First we know from previous research that
some players are indeed willing to punish greedy behavior of others. (See for example
Kahneman et al. (1986)). Secondly, reaponders accumulate quite a considerable amount
of money during the x and y conditiona of the experiment which may make them more
willing to reject marginal amounta in the z-condition. They know that proposers make
a considerable amount of money during the experiment and they might be concerned
about distributional considerations. Hence, they might enjoy punishing proposers who
they expect to be greedy. Being informed at the end of the round whether they indeed
succeeded in inflicting considerable harYrr on the proposer (i.e. whether they indeed did
"the right thing"), might very well contribute positively to their inclination to reject
proposals in the z condition.
We can be brief about the individual learning that is taking place during the game,
since Table 2 Lells the essential story. The general picture is that towards the end of the
game, each individual proposer becomes more greedy and that for most of the proposers
the difference is strict. For example, there are only 5 proposers for who x(x, 3) G
x(x, 1). One of these had his very first proposal (110,5,5) rejected and consequently
made more modest demands. For the other 4 proposers we have x(x, 3) - x(x, 1),
and two people from thia group actually didn't change their behavior at all during the
experiment. (One offera the sequence ((55, 55, 10), (60, 55, 5)(110, 5, 5)) in each cycle, the
other o(fers the sequence ((70, 45, 5), (70, 45, 5)(100,15, 5)) and they both have all their
proposals accepted so that Lhere is indeed very little that they can (need) learn during21
the experiment.)
5 The Data of the Constant Mode
Recall that each group facing the constant mode played the ultimatum game for aix
rounds. Each such group consisted of aix proposers, six reapondera and aix dummies.
The stakes were f 12, - per round in the first three rounds and f24, - per round in the
later rounds. For each of the three iníormation conditions - xyz, y and z- there were
two groups playing constantly this information condition. Hence, in each round we have
12 observations for each iníormation condition. Appendix I gives the proposaLs that were
made in these constant information conditions. Each row corresponds with a proposer.
The first twelve rows give the data for the constant xyz-mode, the next twelve rows
correspond to the constant y-mode, the remaining ones are from the z-mode. Figure 2
displays the average proposal for each round and each information condition. .
[Insert Figure 2 about here.~
Table 10 gives the means and the standard deviations of the proposals. The top (resp.
middle, resp. bottom) panel gives the data for the groups constantly playing the xyz
(resp. y, resp. z) information condition. We write p(cx,t) (resp. p(cy,z), resp. p(cz,t))
for the amount allocated to player P in round t of the constant xyz condition (reap.
constant y, constant z condition. (P E{X,Y, Z}, t- 1,...,6). R.ecall that each cell from
Table 10 is based on 12 observations.22
fi' 9urt 2 : Avtra9rt pro~s41~ ,~.. ~,. oonnjon~ rk~ . Sol~á ~ int3(-) - z,fo. cz..rl xy
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Table 10 Averages and standazd deviations of the proposals in the groups play~ng con-
stantly in[ormation conditions. Top panel: condition cxyz, middle paneL condition
cy, bottom panel: condition cz.
We now brie8y comment on some aapects of Lhese data and then turn our attention
to the comparison of the constant mode with the cycle mode.
One reason why we let players play only six rounds in the constant mode, apart from
space constraints, was that we expected them to learn quickly how to play the game.
Indeed we see that, in the last three rounds the averages do not move very much and that
in most cases the variability of the proposals is less in later rounds. Also, the average
proposal is not monotonic with respect to players' experience. (Compare with Table 2
for the cycle mode.) Hence, the behavior more or less settles down after three rounds of
experience.
Several regularities that we already discussed extensively for the cycle mode; are also
found in the data of the constant mode. The assumption of fairness is rejected: expe-
rienced proposers only allocate marginal amounts (i.e. C 2e) to dummies in condition
cy and to responders in condition cz. As in the cycle mode, starting from the third
round, we have that y(cz) ~ z(cy) but the difference is small. It is also noteworthy that
experienced playera only assign a marginal amount to Z in the case of full information
(i.e. z(cz) G 2e). The average proposal is far from the extreme proposal (110,5,5),
hence, the óypothesis of monetazy and purely selfish incentives is again rejected. The
data, however, are consistent with the assumption that the proposers try to maximize
their own payoffa but are somewhat uncertain about the motives oi the responder.
Again, behavior is completely different in the different information conditions. Similar
to the cycle mode we have
x(cx) G x(cy) G x(cz)
y(CZ) ~ y(~) ~ y(~)
z(~y) ~ z(~) ~ z(~Z)25
and the same remarks from the previous section apply to these inequalities. In case
the responder has information about his payoff when deciding, his ahare atabilizes at
some level between ~~~ and ~~3 of the cake. The proposer allocatea approximately ~~3
of the cake to himself in information condition cy and slightly lesa than ~~3 in the full
information case. When the responder has irrelevant information, the propoaer asks for
approximately 3~~ of the cake. It is quite interesting that, in information condition z, the
dummy's average payoff z atabilizes around 20. Table 11 givea the frequency distribution
of z in this information condition. The first line from this table is quite different from
the corresponding table for the cycle mode (Table 9).





















Table 11 z-values of proposals in the groups playing constantly information condition
z.
Table 10 shows that, of the altogether 216 plays of the constant information mode,
17 result in conflict, hence, the percentage of disagreement is 7.9Q!'o. This percéntage is
somewhat higher than in the cycle mode. However, what is quite remarkable is that the
conflicts are about equally distributed across the three information conditiona. This is
in sharp contrast to the cycle mode, where the conflicts were concentrated in aituation
z. We will return to this issue below.
6 Comparisons of the Constant Mode with the Cy-
cle Mode
Comparíng Figure 1 to Figure 2(or Table 2 to Table 10), the reader notices that propoaers
who constantly play the xyz information condition demand more for themselvee than
proposers from the cycle mode ask when they are in this information condition. A similar
remark applies to the iníormation condition y. In contrast, proposers who conatantly
face the favorable information condition z make demands that are somewhat less greedy26
than the demanda ot the proposere from the cycle mode in in[ormation condilion z.






Note that the last two inequalities are nothing but Lhe mirror images of the first two since
the dummy gets only a marginal amount in the full and esaential information conditions.
However, also note that y(cz) ..~ y(z): the proposer does not allocate more to y when
he is constantly facing the information condition z, rather he allocates somewhat more
to the dummy player. In the constant z mode, z atabilizes around 20, while in the cycle
mode the average value oí z in the z-condition is about 15, witó the average falling with
experience.
Because of our amall sample size it is difficult to establish the above inequalities at
high confidence levela. Table 12 givea the t values associated with the hypothesis that,
in the last round, there ie no difference between the cycle mode and the constant mode.
The rows of the table correspond to the information conditions, the columns to the
componente of the proposals. Hence, the top left-hand cell of the matrix gives the t
value associated with the null-hypothesis that x(x) - x(cx). The second entry from the
firat row gives the t value of the null-hypothesis that y(x) - y(cx), etc. We see that
according Lo conventional tests, all null-hypotheses that correspond to the equalities as-
sociated with the above inequalities are indeed rejected at Lhe 5qo level. Of course, the
assumptiona underlying these conventíonal tests are not fulfilled since our subjects have
a history in comrran. Neverthelesa, these t values provide a useful benchmark and we
are convinced that the regularities in the differences between the constant mode and the










Table 12 A quantification of the differences in the proposale in the cycle mode and
the constant mode. The entry ij gives the i value associated with the hypothesis
Ho -j(~) -.l(t) - 0
An explanation for why the proposals in the cycle mode were different from those in
the constant mode might be based on satisficing behavior. Proposers who constantly face
a favorable (resp. unfavorable) information condition find it easier (resp. more difficult)
to reach their aspiration level and they consequently can make lower demands (resp.
must make higher demands). Subjects who face all three information conditiona in the
cycle mode are forced to think about the differences in these conditions and presumably
they quickly realize that they should strive to earn more in the z condition, hence, they
can make lower demands in the remaining information conditions.
In the previous section we already noted the marked difference with respect to re-
jections in the two modes of the experiment. Although the aggregate rejection rates do
not differ very much (6.8qo in the cycle mode, versus 7.9Q1o in the constant mode), the
conflicts are concentrated in information condition z in the cycle mode, while there is no
such concentration in the groups playing the same information eondition for six rounds.
While the differences between the rejections in the two modes of the experiment can
no doubt partly be explained by the systematic differences in the proposals as discussed
above, there also seem to be other factors at work, in particular in the z condition. While
responders playing the cycle mode can "afford" to reject proposals in the z condition
(since they make a considerable amount of money in the remaining two conditions), re-
sponders constantly playing the z conditions realize that they are in a bad bargaining
situation and they learn to resign themselves to their fate. The postexperimental quea-
Lionnaire reveals that the responders in the constant z-mode view the situation as being28
stationary: If one believea it is optional to reject a single proposal, one should actually
reject any proposal. Hence, rejecting is unattractive.
Proposera apparently do not underatand the latter argument, at least they do not
exploit the weak position of the responder, they do not ask for the entire cake. It is quite
striking that the dummy's average payoff stabilizes around 20 in the groups constantly
playing the z-condition; the dummy's payoff is much lower where this condítion occurs
as part of the cycle. Indeed, the frequency distribution in Table 8 is markedly different
from that in Table 12. This phenomenon is quite pazadoxical, and we do not have a
good explanation.
7 Conclusion
The experimental data clearly refute the idea that proposers are intrinsically motivated
by fairness. More apecifically, the idea of altruism (e.g. in the form of additional ar-
gumenta in the utility function, see Ochs and Roth (1989), Bolton (1991)) is rejected.
Proposera mainly do not ask for nearly all oí the cake since they anticipate that such
proposals are more likely to be rejected. (Many proposers list this argument as an an-
swer in our postexperimental questionnaire). The data show that such expectations aze
indeed well-founded. Consequently, it is not true that gamesmanship defeats faírness,
as has sometimes been concluded. (See, for instance, Harrison and McCabe (1992)):
Proposers do not ask for all of the cake and responders reject some nonnegligible offers.
Distributional considerations seem to matter. Proposers are well aware of the fact that
some responders might refuse proposals in which y~x is perceived to be small and they
use the information condition to manipulate the proposal in such a way that it appears
to give the responder a fair ahare.
The results of our experiments clearly demonstrate that the responder Y can only
hope for a significant ahare of the cake in case he has payoff relevant information when
deciding whether to accept or not. Similarly, the dummy player Z's only hope for a
larger than minimal share z aeems to be that his propoaed ahare z serves as a signal
(as in information condition z). Thus, if fairness is a social norm guiding distribution29
behavior, it certainly needs monitoring, i.e. such a norm can only prevail in environments
where distribution behavior can be publicly observed, moet importantly by those with
veto power like in the full message conditions m -(x, y, z). There ie no evidence
tkiat responders care much for dummy players. Fairness as a social norm, therefore, is
restricted to those who can control their own ahare and who, furthermore, have strategic
influence. The hope that fair treatment resulta since others are intrinsically intereated
in fairness is not well founded.
Except for a pilot experiment (with lower incentives and experienced participants) we
did not include the message form m- x. The interesting aspect of this message form ia
obviously whether proposers will signal fairness by not demanding too much and whether
they tend to make y and z equal. In this pilot experiment, almost all proposers offered
only the minimal required amount to the dummy, while the share of the responder was
similar to the share in information condition y in the main experiment.
For the class of full and essential information, our resulta aze pretty much in line with
the usual results in ultimatum bargaining experimenta (See Roth (1992).). In contrast,
the responder gets significantly less in information condition z. Hence, we may conclude
that, in usual ultimatum bargaining, the reaponder only receives a significant share since
he can base his acceptance behavior on the amount assigned to him. Concerning the
dummy player Z our results are closely related to the experimental results of dictator
games. The fact that our extreme results in information conditions m -(x, y, z) and m-
y are more in line with double blind experiments of dictator games than with versions of
this game in which the experimenter could observe the division proposed (see Hoffman et
al. (1993)) demonstrates that anonymity was well preserved in our experiments and that
participants were hardly concerned whether or not experimenters will learn what they
did. One may speculate whether double blind procedures become obsolete in general if
experiments are performed in our way, e.g. with substantial monetary incentives and
relatively large groups of participants in each session.
Our most important finding is that proposers react systematically and atrategically
to the information that respondera receive about the proposal. This regularity was
also observed in Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993). That paper reports results on 2-person30
ultimatum games with incomplete information. It is common knowledge that the size
of the cake is either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6(each possibility with probability r~e), but the
exact size is known only to the proposer. Two different games are compared: The offer
game - in which the responder only gets to hear what the proposer allocates to him
- and the demand game - in which the responder only knowa what the proposer
demands for himself. Although the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the two
game coincide - the proposer ahould always ask for (almoat) the entire cake - actual
behavior is markedly different in the two games. In the ofler game, the proposer offers
an equal split for cake sizes 1 to 4, while he offers 2 for larger cake sizes. In the demand
game, proposers ask for all of the cake for sizes 1, 2 and 3, while they demand 3 for
larger cake sizes. Mitzkewitz and Nagel propose a theory of boundedly rational behavior
to explain these differences. The theory incorporates the ideas that the responder is
likely to reject demands that are visibly unfair and that he will accept offers that he
expects to be fair. By using the strategy method from Selten (1967), the authors are
able to show that strategies that build on these ideas are widely used. The responses
to our postexperimental questionnaire show that in our game players entertain similar
considerations.
In spite of all our efforts to avoid effects of repeated strategic interaction, the strik-
ing differences between the cycle and the constant information treatment observed here
might indicate that participants do not consider each round as an independent decision
task. The fact that proposers who played the z-condition as part of the cycle made greed-
ier demands than proposers who constantly played this condition might be explained by
the hypothesis that proposers in the cycle mode expected some compensation of badly
treated parties in other message forms. (An alternative hypothesis, based on statisfycing
behavior, was advanced in the previous section.) Furthermore, nearly all rejections in
information condition m- z can be explaíned by previous bad experiences, i.e. by a low
assignment y(- 5) in the previous round of playing information condition m- z.
No doubt the cycle mode triggers a more thorough understanding of the situation.
Participants in this cycle mode experience all three information conditions and therefore
react to the opportunities. We have seen that this leads to a stronger dependence on31
the information condition than can be observed in the constant mode. We conclude
from this more generally that decision makera who are confronted with a multiplicity of
different decision problems will usually be more willing to exploit the strategic aspects
of a given situation as compared to othera who mainly envisage the same aituation.
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Code
Dear Participant,
Thank you for showing up!
1'ou aze going to participate in an experimental study oí decision making for which the funding has
been provided by the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) via Ecozoek (Stichting tot Bevordering van óet
Onderzoek in de Economiac~e Wetenschappen). The decision problems that you will encounter are simple
and during the experiment you may earn a considerable amount of money. All the money that you earn
will be yours to keep and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. You will
be paid privately, so that the other pazticipants will not get to see how much you eazned. We hope you
will find the experiment both instructive and rewarding.
Please note your personal identification code that is in the upper right corner of this form. During the
experiment please fill in this number at the appropriate places on all your decision forms. In order to be
paid out at the end of the experiment, you have to return this form to the experimenter, together with all
decision forms with the code filled in. -
The experiment will last for about 1,5 hours. You are asked not to talk to any other participant during
this time period. WE ASK YOU TO REMAIN SILENT AS OF NOW.
The experiment consists of two parts, a preliminary experiment and the main experiment. The prelim-
inary experiment takes place in this room. For the main experiment you will be split into three groups,
your personal code determines to which group you belong and in which room you must be. More detailed
information will be given later. You will have the chance to ask questions to the experimenter after these
instructions have been read aloud. If you then want to ask a question, please raise your hand; the experi-
menter will then come to you and answer your question in private. You can only ask clarifying questions
about procedures, questions about which decisions to make will not be answered.
If there are no more questions, we will distribute the instructions for the preliminary experiment.Appendix B1
Code
Instructions and decision form for the preliminary experiment
Please fill in your personal identification code in the upper right corner.
Inatructiona
You will be randomly mstched with another participant in the experiment, who is getting exactly the
same instructione as you get and who has to make the same decisions. Eacó of you has to make a decision
in two decision situations. In aituation 1, the decision is between ~ and ~ and the payoffs that each of
you gets are given by the following table
your decision ~ ~
your payoff j 7,- j s,-
other's payoff j 1,- j s,-
In situation 2 you have to choose between . and ~ and the payoffs are as follows
your decision . ~
your payoff j 5,- j 3,-
other's payoff j 5,- j lo,-
It will be determined by tossing a coin whether it is your choice or the choice of the other player that
actually matters. If you are selected, only your choices matter to determine the payoffs in the pair, if your
partner is selected, only his choices matter. For example, suppose you choose ~ and ~, and your partner
chooses ~ and .. Then, if you are aelected, the payoffs are j 10,- íor you and j 11,- for the other. If
cliance selects your partner, then the payoffs are f I1,- for each of you.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. If not please make your decision.
Your decision
In situation 1 when 1 have the choice between ~ and ~, I choose:
In situation 2 when I have the choice between . and ~, I choose:
Please wait for further inatructions concerning the main experiment.Appendix B2
The results of the Pretest are visualised in Table B.1. When it was rather costly to give the other f5, this
was rarely done (only 17 cases out of 216), whereas 123 of 216 participants gave up f 1 in order to give f
5 to the other.
Situation
1 2 ~ ~ ~
~ 88 5 93
~ 111 12 123
~ 199 17 216
Table B.1
We refer to the 88 cases with ( ~,.) as 'egoists', the 12 cases with (~,~) as 'altruists', and the 111
cases with (~,.) as 'intermediates'. The 5 observations with ( ~,~) do not make sense since these
pazticipants give f 5 to the other only when it is expensive. Of course, their behavior nright be explained
by a preference for imparity. In the same way, the choices of the 111 intermediates may be induced by
parity conaiderations.Appendix CX
INSTRUCTIONS (For persons with an X-code)
You will be involved in an experiment. The experiment will last for 9 rounda. In each round you (pereon
X) will be randomly matched with two other persons (to be called Y and Z). In different rounds you
will be matched with different peraons and you will not be matched with the same peraons twice. In eacó
round, you will have to make a decieion on how to divide 120 pointa (the equivalent of j 12,-) among
the three persona involved. Hence, 10 pointa is j 1,-. You óave to write the division (z, y, z) that you
pmpoae in column (3) of your deciaion form. Please write the numbers in the correct order, firat the
number x of pointa that you ask for youraelf, then the number y of pointa that you allocate to Y and,
finally, the number z of pointa that you allowte to Z. Make aure that the three numbera add up to 120.
It ia required that z, y and z are all divieíble by 5 and that each of theae numbers is at least
5 i.e. you only can chooae from the numbera 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, ..., . When making your decision, take
into account column (2) of your decision torm Iabelled "Info Cond" (Information condition). This column
determines what information (message) about your proposal is communicated to your partner Y, hence,
what you have to write on the communication aheet as well as in column (4) of your decision form.
(i) If (zyz) is written in column (2), you are asked to communicate your entire proposal hence, you
have to write the complete entry from column (3) of your decision form onto the message box of the
wmmuniwtion sheet;
(ii) If y ia written in column (2), you are asked to only communicate the pointa that you allocate to Y.
Hence, only the second number y from those in column (3) should be written in the message box o[
the communication sheet;
(iii) If z is written in column (2), you are asked to only communicate the points that you allocate to Z,
hence, only the last number z trom those in coiumn (3) should be written in the message box oí the
communication sheet.
The communication sheet will be transferred to the person Y with whom you are matched. This
person has to decide, on the basis of the information that he has, whether he accepts the division
as proposed by you. If he agrees, he writes YES on the communication sheet, if he dces not agree he
writes NO. If Y writea YES, all three peraona in the match will get paid according to yqur proposal, if }'
writes NO, then each peraon in the match gets nothing in this round. After Y has made his decision, the
communication aheet will be transferred back to you, so that you can see what your payoff in this round is,
which you can enter in column (5) of your decision form. Regardless of the information condition person
Y always will be intormed about the entire vector (z, y, z) after his decision. Thua person Y will be able to
compute his payoff for each round on the basis o( the information that he has. At the end ot each round,
the experimenter will fill in the bottom half of the communication sheet and transíer it to peraon Y and
then to person Z so that also this peraon can compute his payoffs. This then ends the currenL round, and
if this round was not yet the last one, you can then make your decision for the next round in which you
are matched with other partners.Appendix CY
INSTRUCTIONS (For persons with a Y-code)
You wíll be involved in an experiment. The experiment will Iast for 9 rounds. In cach round, you
(person 1~) will be randomly matcbed witó two other persons (to be called X and Z). lu diffcrent rounds
you wíll be matched witó different persons, you will not be matched with the same persons twice. In each
round, person X makes a decision on óow to divide 120 pointa (the equivalent of j 12,-) among the three
people involved. Hence, 10 points ia j 1,-. The rules of the experimmt specify that player X can only
choose divisions (z, y, z) of the 120 points in which each of the numben z, y and z ia diviaible
by 5 and each ia at least equal to S, óence only the values 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, ..., can be chosen for the
numbers x, y aud z. Of course, the numbers add up to 120. On a communication sheet, you will get a
message that providea some information on the division that X proposes. As you can see on your decision
form (colunm (2)), there will be three iníormation conditions:
(i) Information Condition zyz: In this case you will get to hear the entire proposal made by person X.
On the communication form the three numbers (z,y,z) are written. The order is such that the first
number is what X asks for himself, the second is what he allocates to you and the third number ia
what is allocated to person Z. -
(ii) Information Condition y: In this case you will get to hear only the number of points y that player
X has allocated to you.
(iii) Information Condition z: In this case you will get to óear only the number ot pointe z that player
X has allocated to the person Z in the triple.
On the basis of the information that is given on the communication sheet, you have to say
whether you accept the proposal or not. If you accept it (write YES on the communication sheet), each
person in the triple will get paid according to the proposed division, if you reject it (write NO) each person
in the match gets nothing in this round. Before making a decision please first insert the message from the
communication sheet into column (3) oí your decision form. Please write your decision both in column
(9) of the decision form as well as on the communiwtion aheet. Also write your personal code on this
communication sheet. After you have filled in the communication sheet, it will be transferred bacJc to X
so that he can wmpute his payoff for hia round. Thereafter, the bottom half o( the communication sheet
will be filled out and in the information conditions y and z, the sheet will be transferred back to you so
that you can see what the actual proposal was in this round. Finally, the aheet will be transferred to Z so
that also person Z is informed and can compute his payoffs. This ends the current round and if this was
not yet the last round, it starts a new round in which you are matched with other partners. At the end of
the experiment please compute your total payoff.Appendix CZ
INSTRUCTIONS (For persons with a Z-code)
You will be involved in an experiment. The experiment will last for 9 rounds. In each round, you
(person Z) will be randomly matched with two other persons (to be called X and Y). In different rounds
you will be matched with different persons and you will not be matcbed with the same peraona twice.
In each round, peroon X makea a decision on how to divide 120 pointa (the equivalent of f 12,-) among
the three people involved. Hence, 10 points is J 1,-. The rules of the experiment apecify that player X
can only choose divieions (z, y, z) of the 120 pointa in which each of the numbera z, y and z
is divisible by S and each ia at leaet equal to S, hence only the valuea 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, ..., can be
cbosen for the numbera z, y and z. Of course, the numbers add up to 120. Person Y gets information (a
message) about the division that X proposes and on the basie of this information person Y has to
decide whether he accepta or rejecta the proposal. If Y accepts (writes YES on the communication sheet),
each person in the triple gets paid according to the proposed division, if Y rejects (writes NO), each player
in the match gets nothing in this round. There are three information conditions:
(i) Information Coadition xyz: In thia ca.ve Y will get to hear the entire proposal made by person X.
(ii) Information Condition y: In this case Y will get to hear only the number of points y that player X
has allocated to peraon Y.
(iii) lnformation Condition z: In this case Y will get to hear only the number of points z that player X
has allocated to you.
You can read in column (2) of your balance aheet which information condition is relevant in each round.
As soon as all decisions in a round have been made, the communication sheet will be transferred to you
ao that you can see what happened, can compute your payotfs and fill in the columns (3), (4) and (5) of
your balance sheet.
As you do not have to make any decisions and since we do not want to keep you idle during the
experiment, we would like to ask your cooperation in the running of the experiment and to help keep
control of the earnings of all aubjects. Somebody else will control your own balance sheet, so do not try
to cheat. Any attempt to do so will be punished by excluding you from the experiment.
Specifically, we will provide you, after each round with all the communication aheets írom that round
and we want you to administer the earnings of all the participants in each round and tó compute, at the
end of the experimeat, the total earninga o[ eacó participant. This procedure will enable us to check the
earnings of the other participants and to pay each person exactly the amount that he has earned.
We appreciate your cooperation.Appendix CX
INSTRUCTIONS (For persona with an X-code)
~'ou will be involved in an experiment. The experiment will last [or 9 rounds. In each round you (person
X) will be randomly matched with two other persons (to be called Y and Z). In differcnt roimds you
will be matched witó different persone and you will not be matched with the same persons twice. In each
round, you will have to make a decision on how to divide I20 pointa (the equivalent -o[ J 12,-) among
the three petsons involved. Hence, 10 points ís J 1,-. You have to write the division (x, y, z) that you
propose in column (3) of your decision form. Please write the numbers in the correct order, first the
number x of pointa that you ask for youraelf, then the number y of pointa that you allocate to Y and,
finally, the number z of points that you allocate to Z. Make sure that the three numbers add up to 120.
It is required that x,y and z are all divisible by 5 and that each of these numbere ie at least
5 i.e. you only can choose from the numbera 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, ..., . When making your decision, take
into account column (2) of your decision form labelled "lnfo Cond" (Information condition). Thia column
determines what information (message) about your proposal is communicated to your partner Y, óence,
what vou have to write on the communication sheet as well as in column (4) of your decision torm.
(i) If (xyz) is written in column (2), you are asked to communicate your entire proposal óence, you
have to write the complete entry from column (3) of your decision form onto the message box of the
communication sheet;
(ii) If y is written in column (2), you aze asked to only communiwte the points that you allocate to Y.
Hence, only the second number y from thoae in column (3) should be written in the message box of
the communication aheet;
(iii) If z is written in column (2), you aze asked to only communicate the points that you allocate to Z,
hence, only the last number z from those in column (3) should be written in the message box of the
communication sheet.
The communication aheet will be tranaferred to the person Y with whom you ate matched. This
person has to decide, on the basia of the information that he has, whether he accepts the division
as proposed by you. If he agrees, he writes YES on the communication sheet, if he does not agree he
writes NO. If Y writea YES, all three persona in the match will get paid according to your propoeal, if Y
writes NO, then each person in the match gets nothing in this round. After Y óaa made his decision, the
communication sheet will be transferred back to you, so that you can see what your payoff in this round is,
which you can enter in column (5) of your decision form. Regardleas of the information condition person
Y always wíll be informed about the eatire vector (x, y, z) after óis decision. Thus person Y will be able to
compute his payoff for each round on the basis of the information that he has. At the end of each round,
the experimenter will fill in the bottom half ot the communication sheet and transfer it to person Y and
then to person Z so that also this person can compute his payoffs. This then ends Lhe current round, and
it this round was not yet the last one, you can then make your decisioa Íor the next round in which you
are matd~ed with other partners.Appendix CY
INSTRUCTIONS (For persons with a Y-code)
You will be involved in an experiment. The experiment will last for 9 rounds. In each round, you
(person Y) will be randomly matched with two other persons (to be called X and Z). In different rounds
you will be matched with di(ferent peraona, you will not be matched with the same persona twice. In each
round, person X makes a decision on how to divide 120 pointa (the equivalent of j 12,-) among the three
people involved. Hence, 10 points ia j 1,-. The ruka of the experiment epecify that player X can only
choose divisiona (x, y, z) of the 120 pointa in which each of the numbers z, y and z is diviaible
by S and each is at least equal to 5, óence only the values 5, 10, 15, Z0, 25, ..., can be chosen for the
numbers x, y and z. Of courae, the numbere add up to 120. On a communication sheet, you will get a
message that provides some information on the division that X proposes. As you can see on your decision
(orm (column (2)), there will be three information conditions:
(~) Information Condition xyr: In this caae you will get to heaz the entire proposal made by person X.
On the communication form the three numbers (x, y, z) are written. The order is such that the first
number is what X asks for himself, the second is what he allocates to you and the third number is
what is allocated to person Z. -
(ii) lnformation Condition y: In Lhis case you will get to hear only the number oí points y that player
X has allocated to you.
(iii) Information Condition z: In this case you will get to hear only the number of points z that player
X has allocated to the person Z in the tríple.
On the baais of the information that is given on the communication aheet, you have to say
whelher you accept the proposal or not. If you accept it (write YES on the communication sheet), each
person in the triple will get paid according to the proposed division, if you reject it (write NO) each person
in the match gets nothing in this round. Before making a decision please first insert the message from the
communication sheet into column (3) of your decision form. Please write your decision both in column
(4) of the decision form as well as on the communication sheet. Also write your personal code on this
communication sheet. After you have filled in the communication sheet, it will be transferred back to X
so that he can compute his payo(f for his round. Thereafter, the bottom half of the communication sheet
will be filled out and in the iníormation conditions y and z, the sheet will be transferrgd back to you so
that you can see what the actual proposal was in this round. Finally, the sheet will be transferred to Z so
that also person Z is informed and can compute his payoffs. This ends the current round and if this was
not yet the last round, it etarts a new round in which you are matched with other partners. At the end of
the experiment please compute your total payoff.Appendix CZ
INSTRUCTIONS ( For persons with a Z-code)
You will be involved in an experiment. The experiment will laet for 9 rounda. In each round, you
(person Z) will be randomly matched with two other persons (to be called X and Y). In difierent rounds
you will be matched with different persone and you will not be matched witó the same persons twice.
In eacó round, person X makes a decision on how to divide 120 pointe (the equivaknt of j 12,-) among
the three people involved. Hence, 10 points is f 1,-. The rules of the experiment apecify that player X
can only choose diviaione (z,y,z) of the 120 pointa in which eacó of the numbere z,y and z
is divisible by 5 and each ia at leaat equal to 5, hence only the valuea 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, ..., can be
chosen for the numbera x,y and z. Of courae, the numbero add up to 120. Peraon Y gets information (a
message) about the division that X proposes and on the basis of thia information person Y has to
decide whether he accepts or rejects the proposal. If Y accepts (writes YES on the communication sheet),
each person in the triple gets paid according to the proposed division, it Y rejecta (writes NO), each player
in the match gets nothing in this round. There are three information conditions:
(i) Information Condition xyz: In this care Y will get to hear the entire propoeal made by person X.
(ii) Information Condition y: In this case Y will get to hear only the number of points y that player X
has allocated to person Y.
(iii) Information Condition z: In this case Y will get to óear only the number of points z that player X
has allocated to you.
You can read in column (2) of your balance sheet which information condition ia relevant in each round.
As soon as all decisions in a round have been made, the communication sheet will be transfened to you
so that you can see what happened, can compute your payoffs and fitl in the columna (3), (4) and (5) of
your balance sheet.
As you do not have to make any deciaions and since we do not want to keep you idle during the
experiment, we would like to ask your cooperation in the running of the experiment and to help keep
control of the earnings oí all subjects. Somebody eL9e will wntrol your own balance sheet, ao do not try
to cheat. Any attempt to do so will be puniahed by excluding you from the experiment.
Specifically, we will provide you, a[ter each round with all the communication eheets from that round
and we want you to administer the earnings of all the participanta in each round and to compute, at the
end of the experiment, the total earninga of each participant. This procedure will enable us to cheelc the
earnings o( the other participants and to pay each person exactly the amount that he óas earned.
N'e appreciate your cooperation.Appendix DX
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Note: 10 points are J 1,-.
Appendix DY
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Note: 10 points are J 1,-!ppendix DZ
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~lease do not write on this part. (It will be filled out by the experimenters, who, at the end ot each round






We would be grateful if you could answer the following questions. In the meantime we will prepare your
earnings.
1. Which division of the 120 points do you consider to be fair in this situation?
x y z
The aum of x, y and z must be 120!
2. Which ot the folbwing two distributions of the 120 pointa do you conaider more fair? (Pleasc circle
the appropriate answer?)
(40, 40, 40) or (60, 30, 30)
(110, 5, 5) or (60, 30, 30)
3. Please indicale in the following table, whether, in information condition y, you as a responder would
accept (YES) or reject (NO) if the amount from the first line was offered to you?
amount y
response
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 55 60 70 75 80 85 90
4. Please indicate in the following table, whether, in information condition z, you as a responder would
accept (YES) or reject (NO) if thc amount from the first line was offered to the third person?
amount z
response
5 ]0 15 20 25 30 40 45 50 55 60
5. Do you think Lhat the main purpose of this experiment is to explore
O whether people care for others' well-being?
~ whether people try to earn as much money as possible?
O some other aspects o[ behavior?
(Please, mark only one of the three alternatives.)
65 70 75 80 85 90
6. Could you briefly describe which behavior rule you followed in the experiment and why you did so?
Thank you for your cooperation.Appendix G1: Matching scheme for 6 persons
111 222 333 444 555 666
123 234 345 456 561 612
135 246 351 462 513 624
142 253 364 415 526 631
154 265 316 421 532 643
166 21 1 322 433 544 655
Key: In first round X„ is matched with Y„ and Z„ (n - 1, ..., 6).
IC in round t, Xk with Y, then in t f 1, Xk with Y~~.
If in round t, X~ with Z,,,, then in t f 1, Y with Z,,,t~.
(clockwise rotation; the rows are the rounds.)
Appendix G2: Matching scheme for 9 persons
111 222 333 444 555 666 777 888 999
123 234 345 456 567 678 789 891 91-2
135 246 357 468 579 681 792 813 924
147 258 369 471 582 693 714 825 936
159 261 372 483 594 615 726 837 948
162 273 384 495 516 627 738 849 951
174 285 396 417 528 639 741 852 963
186 297 318 429 531 642 753 864 975
198 219 321 432 543 654 765 876 987







































V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23
55 55 10 1 85 30 5 1 85 5 30 0 60 55 5 1 60 55 5 1 110 5 5 1 40 40 40 1 55 60 5 1 110 5 5 1
40 40 40 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1 60 55 5 1 65 50 5 1 110 5 5 1 50 50 20 1 70 40 10 1 95 5 20 1 40 40 40 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1 55 55 10 1 55 60 5 1 110 5 5 0
55 55 10 1 60 55 5 1 110 5 5 1
45 45 30 1 55 60 5 1 70 20 30 0 50 40 30 1 60 40 20 1 80 30 10 0
60 55 5 1 70 45 5 1 110 5 5 1
45 45 30 1 70 40 10 1 70 30 20 1
50 40 30 1 60 50 10 1 50 30 40 1
40 40 40 1 55 60 5 1 110 5 5 1
75 40 5 1 85 30 5 1 110 5 5 1
40 40 40 1 60 40 20 1 75 5 40 1
40 50 30 1 50 40 30 1 50 35 35 1
40 40 40 1 70 40 10 1 70 20 - 30 - 1
40 40 40 1 60 55 5 1 80 30 10 1
40 40 40 1 65 50 5 1 110 5 5 0
50 40 30 1 50 60 10 1 60 25 35 0
70 45 5 1 70 45 5 1 100 15 5 1
60 55 5 1 70 45 5 1 110 5 5 1 60 30 30 1 80 20 20 0 80 10 30 1
30 45 45 1 55 60 5 1 60 30 30 1
50 50 20 1
-
60 55 5 1 60 5 55 1
110 5 5 0 60 55 5 1 80 5 35 0
65 45 10 1 80 35 5 0 105 5 10 1
75 40 5 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1
55 55 10 1 60 55 5 1 110 5 5 1
50 40 30 1 80 30 10 1 80 10 30 1
55 55 10 1 50 60 10 1 110 5 5 1
60 40 20 1 75 40 5 1 100 15 5 1
60 40 20 1 40 50 30 1 70 20 30 1 40 50 30 1 55 55 10 1 110 5 5 1







































V24 V25 V26 V27
55 10 55 1
65 50 5 1
55 55 10 1
55 55 10 1
65 50 5 1
60 55 5 1
40 40 40 1
60 55 5 1
55 55 10 1
45 50 25 1
60 50 10 1
65 50 5 1
50 40 30 1
50 40 30 1
55 60 5 1
75 40 5 1
40 40 40 1
50 50 20 1
40 - 40 40 1
50 35 35 1
55 60 5 1
55 55 10 1
70 45 5 1
65 50 5 1
80 30 10 1
55 55 10 1
40 40 40 1
60 30 30 1
65 45 10 1
80 35 5 1
60 55 5 1
70 40 10 1
60 55 5 1
65 50 5 1
60 55 5 1
55 55 10 1
V28 V29 V30 V31
90 25 5 1
70 45 5 1
55 60 5 1
75 40 5 1
70 45 5 1
75 40 5 1
75 40 5 1
65 50 5 1
60 55 5 1
55 60 5 1
70 40 10 1
60 50 10 1
75 40 5 1
65 50 5 1
55 60 5 1
75 40 5 1
80 35 5 1
55 45 20 1
75 35 10 1
70 45 5 1
65 50 5 1
60 50 10 1
70 45 5 1
75 40 5 1
70 45 5 1
65 50 5 1
65 50 5 1
70 45 5 1
80 35 5 1
80 35 5 1
60 55 5 1
90 25 5 1
60 55 5 1
75 40 5 1
65 50 5 1
60 55 5 1
V32 V33 V34 V35
70 25 25 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
75 5 40 0
90 5 25 1
110 5 5 1
60 20 40 -1-
70 30 20 1
110 5 5 1
100 10 10 1
75 5 40 1
110 5 5 1
90 25 5 1
95 5 20 1
70 15 35 0
100 5 15 1
85 30 5 1
110 5 5 1
70 20 25 1
100 15 5 1
110 5 5 0
80 5 35 1
70 35 15 1
70 5 45 1
70 5 45 1
105 5 10 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
100 5 15 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1
110 5 5 1







































36 V37 V3B V39 V40 V41 V42 V43 V44 V45 V46 V47
70 25 25 1 90 25 5 1 70 25 25 1
75 40 5 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1
55 55 10 1 55 60 S 1 110 5 5 0
55 55 10 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 0
70 45 5 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1
60 55 5 1 70 45 5 1 105 5 10 1
65 45 10 1 70 45 5 1 110 5 5 1
65 50 5 1 70 45 5 1 90 5 25 1
55 55 10 1 60 55 5 1 110 5 5 1
45 45 30 1 60 55 5 -1 65 20 -35 - 0-
60 50 10 1 70 40 10 1 70 30 20 1
75 40 5 1 70 45 5 1 110 5 5 1
55 40 25 1 75 40 5 1 100 10 10 1
50 45 25 1 65 50 5 1 110 5 5 1
55 60 5 1 55 60 5 1 110 5 5 0
90 25 5 1 90 25 5 0 110 5 5 1
50 40 30 1 85 30 5 1 100 5 15 1
45
-
50 25 1 60 50 10 1 70 20 30 1
55 55 10 1 75 40 5 1 110 5 5 1
60 55 5 1 75 40 5 1 90 25 5 1
55 60 5 1 65 50 5 1 110 5 5 0
65 50 5 1 65 50 5 1 90 20 10 1
70 45 5 1 70 45 5 1 100 15 5 1
65 50 5 1 75 40 5 1 100 5 15 1
80 35 5 1 90 25 5 1 90 5 25 0
55 55 10 1 75 40 5 1 105 5 10 1
55 55 10 1 75 40 5 1 75 5
-
40 1
55 30 35 1 80 35 5 1 BO 5 35 1
75 40 5 1 65 30 . 5 1 105 5 10 1
85 30 5 1 85 30 5 1 100 5 15 1
65 50 5 1 65 50 5 1 110 5 5 1
80 30 10 1 90 25 5 1 100 5 15 1
65 50 5 1 60 55 5 1 110 5 5 1
70 45 5 1 85 30 5 1 110 5 5 1
65 50 5 1 70 45 5 1 110 5 5 1
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